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Abstract
This Article contains some reflections concerning the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution
for Europe (“the Draft Treaty”), which was approved by the European Council on September 28,
2004 and formally signed in Rome on October 29, 2004. At the time of writing in early 2005, it
is presently in the process of ratification by the twenty-five Member States of the European Union
(“EU”). The Article is primarily concerned with the extent to which the Treaty is a constitution,
and its merits and demerits as such. It does not go in any depth into the political desirability of
some of the changes made by the Treaty.
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This Article contains some reflections concerning the Draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe ("the Draft
Treaty") ,' which was approved by the European Council on Sep-
tember 28, 2004 and formally signed in Rome on October 29,
2004. At the time of writing in early 2005, it is presently in the
process of ratification by the twenty-five Member States of the
European Union ("EU").2 The Article is primarily concerned
with the extent to which the Treaty is a constitution, and its mer-
its and demerits as such. It does not go in any depth into the
political desirability of some of the changes made by the Treaty
such as:'
whether the Treaty materially advances the evolution of the
EU into a United States of Europe;4
whether it will effectively deprive Member States of auton-
omy in the field of foreign and security policy;5
whether it will lead to Member States losing control of their
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1. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, OJ. C 310/1
(2004) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty]. The Draft Treaty has been pub-
lished by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (2005).
2. Article IV of the Draft Treaty leaves the method of its ratification to the "respec-
tive constitutional requirements" of the individual Member States, a condition which
arguably denies it the character of a true constitution. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art.
IV-447(1), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 191. A number of countries have already ratified the
Draft Treaty: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Spain. However, referenda in France and the Netherlands have resulted
in "No" majorities.
3. The writer is indebted to the Rt. Hon. John Redwood MP for the identification
of many of the issues listed below over the course of a series of seminars sponsored by
the Ford Foundation and held at All Souls College.
4. The notion of a fully integrated European entity is nothing new: as early as
World War II, Winston Churchill called for a governmental construct to which he re-
ferred to as "a kind of United States of Europe." See DESMOND DiNAN, EUROPE RECAST: A
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 22-25 (2004).
5. Since its formal creation in the Treaty on European Union, effective on Novem-
ber 1, 1993, cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy takes place outside
the decision-making procedures of the European Community and on the basis of col-
laboration between individual Member States. The current consolidated text of the
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armed forces and create a European world power in military
terms;6
whether it will deprive Member States of control over their
external borders;7
whether it will create a common fiscal regime as well as a
common currency throughout the entire EU;8
whether it will lead to Member States losing their distinctive
justice systems (perhaps to an even greater extent than is the
position within the United States of America);9
alternatively whether it will ensure much greater respect in
practice for the principle of subsidiarity (something that is
touched on in this Paper);1 ° and
Treaty on European Union ("TEU") sets out the Provisions on a Common Foreign and
Security Policy in Title V, Articles 11-28, O.J. C 325/1 (Dec. 24, 2002).
6. Noting the tension between maintaining national sovereignty and developing
an assertive EU security presence, the European Council has repeatedly acknowledged
the intergovernmental nature of the European Security and Defence Policy ("ESDP")
and explicitly laid out those military powers retained by the Member States. See Panos
Koutrakos, Constitutional Idiosyncrasies and Political Realities: The Emerging Security and De-
fense Policy of the European Union, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 69, 82 (2003) (pointing out that
the policy would not affect the right of the Member States to protect their sovereignty
when they deem it to be in danger).
7. The Draft Treaty enables EU legislation governing external border controls, asy-
lum, immigration, and judicial and police cooperation in Articles IV-257 to IV-277. See
Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV-257 to IV-277, O.J. C 310/1 (2004). See, e.g., Stephen
C. Sieberson, How the New European Union Constitution will Allocate Power between the EU
and its Member States: A Textual Analysis, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 993, 1034 (2004).
8. After considerable debate, the Draft Treaty text does not materially alter the
present European Community Treaty provisions governing the harmonization of taxa-
tion. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 111-170 to 111-172, O.J. C 310/1 (2004). The
United Kingdom and other governments successfully prevented the adoption of text
facilitating such harmonization by the introduction of qualified majority voting in the
Council. As for the common currency, the Euro, twelve Member States replaced their
national currencies with the Euro on January 1, 2002. Protocols 13 and 14 to the Draft
Treaty, supra note 1, preserve the right of Denmark and the United Kingdom, granted
initially by Protocols to the Treaty on European Union, to remain outside the final
stage of Monetary Union, retaining their national currencies and preserving the inde-
pendence of their central banks from the monetary policy control exercised by the
European Central Bank. See generally Alexis Krachai et al., The United Kingdom, in THE
EURO IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 319-50 (Jean-Victor Louis ed., 2002).
9. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 111-270-74, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 118-21
(outlining measures for judicial cooperation in criminal matters).
10. Meant to ensure that the EU does not trample Member States' claims to demo-
cratic self-governance and cultural diversity, the principle of subsidiarity calls for EU
institutions to refrain from acting, even when constitutionally permitted to do so, if
their objectives could effectively be served by action taken at or below the Member State
level. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 332, 334 (1994); see also Christian
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whether it may not open the door to integration in particu-
lar areas of government as between groups of Member States
that want to go further than is unanimously agreeable, thus in-
creasing rather than reducing flexibility.11
Since the evolution of the EU will depend as much on the
political initiatives and changes agreed to by the governments of
the Member States as on the wording of the Treaty itself, the
answers to those questions - and whether one views those an-
swers favorably or unfavorably - depend on political judgment
as much as on legal analysis. This Paper is primarily concerned
with the latter.
However, in this area even what is put forward as legal analy-
sis is almost bound to be colored by the ideological standpoint of
the analyst. It is therefore proper that the writer should disclose
his own ideological standpoint so that the reader can make al-
lowance for it in what follows.
First, I believe that there are great economic and personal
advantages if Europeans can move as freely around Europe as
Americans move around the United States, and if a single Euro-
pean market is realized for goods, services and capital.
Secondly, I believe that, especially as globalization has in-
creased, there are many important things that can be done effec-
tively, and sometimes that can be done at all, only at the Euro-
pean rather than the national level and within a legal framework
that confers powers on permanently constituted European insti-
tutions.
Thirdly, I believe that the primary function of those institu-
tions is to improve the living conditions - economic, environ-
mental and moral - of those who live in Europe when that
function cannot be performed effectively, or perhaps at all, by
Member States acting separately. I also accept that whether the
Kirchner, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Treaty on European Union, 6 TUL. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 291 (1998). The Draft Treaty's Protocol on the application of the principles
of subsidiarity and proportionality largely reproduces the text of the Protocol on Sub-
sidiarity currently annexed to the Treaty on European Union.
11. Title VII of the current Treaty on European Union on Provisions on Closer
Cooperation, as amended most recently by the Treaty of Nice (effective February 1,
2003), in Articles 43-45 enables eight or more Member States to engage in "enhanced
cooperation between themselves" through use of EU institutions, but only through a
complex procedure. The Draft Treaty's Article 1-44 on Enhanced Cooperation pro-
vides for a somewhat simpler procedure whenever at least one-third of all Member
States desire to engage in such cooperation.
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function is performed at the European or at the national level, it
should be performed with a proper regard for the interests of
our fellow humans outside of Europe and for the overall ecology
of the world in which we live.
At the same time, I am profoundly unimpressed by ideologi-
cal objectives that do not contribute to the primary objectives
that I have just described. I am also deeply suspicious of the
highfalutin demands and claims made by some politicians and
some bureaucrats who are largely insulated from the problems
that bedevil the ordinary citizen, and who risk becoming a privi-
leged intelligentsia with its own self-congratulating preoccupa-
tions. So much for my own "healthy prejudices."
The picture that emerges from the Draft Treaty is a compli-
cated one - as I would argue, excessively so. Even though dif-
ferent commentators have cast light on different parts of the
canvas, I have no doubt that honest viewers will perceive the pic-
ture differently.' 2 I myself started with a completely open mind
as to whether the new Treaty was, or was not, at least on balance
a good development.
My first conclusion is that what we have been looking at is
not a constitution. 3 Some readers may be familiar with
Magritte's picture of a smoker's pipe under which Magritte has
inscribed the words, "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" ("this is not a
pipe").' 4 If Magritte were still alive and had been invited to pro-
duce a front cover for the Treaty, he might have sensibly in-
cluded an inscription: "This is not a constitution."
12. Among the many commentators on aspects of the Draft Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe are, e.g., Anthony Arnull, The Member States of the European
Union and Giscards Blueprint for Its Future, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 503 (2004); Jacqueline
Dutheil de la Rochere, The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights in the Draft Constitu-
tional Treaty, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345 (2004); Roger Goebel, The European Union in
Transition: The Treaty of Nice in Effect; Enlargement in Sight; A Constitution in Doubt, 27
FoRDHMA INr'L LJ. 455 (2004) [hereinafter Goebel, European Union in Transition];
Koen Lenaerts & Damien Gerard, The Structure of the Union According to the Constitution
for Europe: The Emperor Is Getting Dressed, 29 EUR. L. REV. 289 (2004);John Temple Lang,
The Main Issues After the Convention on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, 27 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 544 (2004); Sieberson, supra note 7.
13. Other commentators also conclude that the Draft Treaty establishing a Consti-
tution for Europe is fundamentally in legal terms still a treaty and not a true constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Anthony Arnull, supra note 12, at 507. For the view that the text moves
"away from the realm of international law towards substantial constitutionality," see
Lenaerts & Gerard, supra note 12, at 297.
14. See RENt MAGRITTE, LA TRAHISON DES IMAGES [THE TREASON OF IMAGES] (1929).
2005] THE TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION 1095
A few weeks ago I listened to the Lord Chancellor, Lord
Falconer of Thoroton, deliver the 2004 Atkin Lecture at the Re-
form Club in London.1 5 The topic about which he spoke was
the British government's domestic constitutional "reforms" or
"changes," the appropriateness of the description according to
the rhetorical purposes in mind.16 The Lord Chancellor
stressed that the Government was entirely against the idea of en-
acting a written constitution for the United Kingdom.1 7 To do
so, he said, would impair the sovereignty of the United Kingdom
Parliament, prevent the continuing evolution of United King-
dom constitutional principles and practice in light of changing
conditions in the world around us, and give excessive power to
the judicial branch of government.1 8 At the end of the Lord
Chancellor's lecture, a member of the audience asked him how
he squared those views with the Government's espousal of the
projected EU Constitution. That, said the Lord Chancellor, was
totally different: a treaty is necessary to define the relationship
between twenty-five sovereign States which have come together
for a number of purposes, subject to defined conditions. 9
I respectfully agree with the Lord Chancellor that the Draft
Treaty is indeed a treaty and not a constitution, though it has
constitutional aspects. Those aspects to some extent unavoid-
ably carry with them drawbacks similar to those that led the Brit-
ish Government to eschew the introduction of a written constitu-
tion for the United Kingdom. In this respect, the Draft Treaty is
not fundamentally different from the earlier European Commu-
15. See Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Atkin Lecture at the Reform Club in London
(2004) [hereinafter Atkin Lecture].
16. See, e.g., Sir David Williams, The Courts and Legislation: Anglo-American Contrasts,
8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 323, 325 (2001) (discussing the lack of a formal written
constitution and the lack of a federal structure in the United Kingdom); see also Peter L.
Fitzgerald, Constitutional Crisis Over the Proposed Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, 18
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 233 (2004).
17. See Atkin Lecture, supra note 15.
18. As the core democratic institution, the British Parliament has retained its ulti-
mate sovereignty over the judiciary, effectively precluding any form ofjudicial review of
its own activities (though not of subordinate legislation). See Ariel L. Bendor & Zeev
Segal, Constitutionalism and Trust in Britain: An Ancient Constitutional Culture, A New Judi-
cial Review Model, 17 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 683, 689-90 (2002); see also Fitzgerald, supra
note 16, at 234 (noting the ability of an unwritten constitution to evolve and adapt to
new circumstances over time, as compared to the rigid structure and amendment pro-
cess of a written constitution such as that of the United States).
19. See Atkin Lecture, supra note 15.
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nity ("EC") 20 and EU treaties, all of which contained constitu-
tional aspects. 2' To the extent that the initial accession by the
United Kingdom to the EC was sold to the British public as signi-
fying no more than joining a free trade area that was rather
more integrated than the European Free Trade Area
("EFFA") ,22 the prospectus was a false one. 2' Therefore I agree
with the distinguished Belgian jurist, Professor Walter van
Gerven, that even in its present state the European Community,
though not a federation per se, is a federal entity. 24 That will con-
tinue to be true if the Draft Treaty is ratified.
That the Draft Treaty is not itself a constitution is illustrated
by the following fact. It is a well-known principle of public inter-
national law that, while sovereign States are bound to observe at
least a minimum standard of conduct towards citizens of other
States, public international law says nothing about the standards
of conduct that they are bound to observe in relation to their
20. The current European Community Treaty in consolidated form, as amended
most recently by the Treaty of Nice (effective February 1, 2003), is published in O.J. C
325/1 (Dec. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty].
21. The Court of Justice of the European Communities ("ECJ") has twice de-
scribed the European Community Treaty and the other two Communities treaties as a
"constitutional charter based on the rule of law," notably in Paragraph 21 of Opinion
1/91 on the European Economic Area Treaty, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6084. Numerous com-
mentators have agreed with the Court in assessing the present treaties as possessing
significant constitutional characteristics. See, e.g., Jean-Claude Piris, Does the European
Union Have a Constitution? Does It Need One?, 24 EUR. L. REv. 537 (1997) (in which the
present Director-General of the Legal Service of the Council presents a legal analysis
that concludes that the present treaties have essential elements of a constitution, al-
though far from creating a State as such); Lenaerts & Gerard, supra note 12, at 292-93
(reaching the same conclusion).
22. See Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association [hereinafter
EFTA], Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 5. The United Kingdom and six other Nations
founded EFTA in 1960 as a regional mechanism to promote free trade among its mem-
bers. Subsequently, the United Kingdom and most of the EFTA Nations left EFTA to
join the European Community. The EFTA is currently comprised of Iceland, Liechten-
stein, Norway, and Switzerland. See The EFTA Secretariat, EFTA at a Glance: Introduc-
tion, available at http://secretariat.efta.int (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
23. It is perhaps worth recalling that Lord Bridge's opinion in the well-known case,
Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., [1991] All E.R. 70, [1990]
C.M.L.R. 375, declared that the United Kingdom had implicitly accepted the
supremacy of Community law as enunciated by the ECJ when it acceded to the Euro-
pean Community, despite public comments to the contrary.
24. See Walter van Gerven, The Emergence of a Common European Law in the Area of
Tort Law: The EU Contribution, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVE 135-36 (Duncan Fairgrieve et al. eds., 2002) (comparing the jurispru-
dential relationship between EU law and the law of its Member States, as interpreted by
the ECJ, with that between federal law and state law in the United States).
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own citizens (subject to exceptions, such as the prohibition of
genocide). Therefore, even though public international law
prohibits States from treating foreigners worse in certain impor-
tant respects than they treat their own citizens, it does not pro-
hibit them from treating their own citizens worse in those re-
spects than they are bound to treat foreigners.25
Even though the citizens of Member States are already citi-
zens of the existing EU, 26 and will be citizens of the new EU
created by the Draft Treaty, the rule of public international law
to which I have referred will continue to apply27 so as to enable
Member States to practise so-called "reverse discrimination"
against their own citizens,28 subject only to specific exceptions
created by specific provisions of the Treaty or specific legislative
measures taken at the EU level pursuant to such provisions. In
other words, it is citizenship of another Member State rather
than citizenship of the EU that carries with it constitutional
rights within the EU.
In this connection I leave aside the fact that, for quite a long
time, citizens of the new acceding Member States will not enjoy
freedom of movement of workers in many EU States because
that can be dismissed as a merely transitional situation.29 Con-
25. See, e.g., Dr. Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, Fundamental Rights in the E. U., in THE ABC
OF COMMUNITY LAw 13, 16 (5th ed. 2000) available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/
about/abcen.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005) (noting that the principle of equal treat-
ment does not preclude nationals and home-produced goods from being subject to
stricter requirements than citizens or products from other Member States).
26. The principle that all Member State nationals also enjoy citizenship of the
Union (or European citizenship, as it is often called), was introduced by the Maastricht
Treaty (effective November 1, 1993), and is currently found in Article 17 of the Euro-
pean Community Treaty, supra note 20, O.J. C 324/1 (Dec. 24, 2002).
27. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1-10(1), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 13-14 (re-
flecting the current Article 17 in stating that "[c]itizenship of the Union shall be addi-
tional to national citizenship and shall not replace it").
28. The phenomenon of "reverse discrimination" is a consequence of the overrid-
ing EC Treaty obligations of free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. See
MIGUEL POLARES MADURO, WE T1-E COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 154 n.7 (1998) ("[w]hen a non-discriminatory na-
tional measure is struck down by the Court because it is capable of restricting free
trade, it is normally so only with respect to imported products, thus creating discrimina-
tion against national products"). For an example of reverse discrimination in the con-
text of free movement of persons, see Regina v. Saunders, Case 175/78, [1979] E.C.R.
1129, holding that a UK national confined by court order to residence in Northern
Ireland is not a migrant worker and accordingly has no claim to rights under the EC
Treaty.
29. Pursuant to the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession, O.J. L 236/33
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sider instead the position of university students in Scotland. Citi-
zens of, for example, the Netherlands and the Republic of Ire-
land currently enjoy the same privileged treatment with regard
to fees as do Scottish residents.3 0 Residents of Northern Ireland,
England and Wales, by contrast, continue to be subject to dis-
crimination."
In other respects too, the Draft Treaty is clearly an intergov-
ernmental arrangement rather than the constitution of a suprana-
tional entity. Quite apart from the enhanced role of the Euro-
pean Council 2 (which is comprised of national governments),
consider the obligation of the Member States, as such, to provide
aid and assistance by all means in their power if any other Mem-
ber State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory.3 3 This
obligation is independent of any progress made in framing a
"common Union defense policy," let alone achieving a "common
defense."3 4 Moreover, unlike the required response if a Member
State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural
or man-made disaster, this mutual defense obligation does not
require the EU and its Member States to act jointly. 5 In other
(Sept. 23, 2003), which governs the accession of the 10 new Member States that joined
the EU on May 1, 2004, Annexes specific to each new State set out transitional measures
permitting the current Member States to retain their existing limitations on the free
movement of workers and self-employed persons for successive periods cumulating to a
maximum of seven years. Almost all the current Member States accordingly have some
sort of restriction on free entry and residence for nationals of the new States. See Roger
Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for the Central European and
Mediterranean States, 1 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 15, 47-48 (2004).
30. The ECJ concluded that the fundamental right of non-discrimination based on
nationality applied to students from any Member State in several well-known judg-
ments. See Gravier v. City of Liege, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593; see also Blaizot v.
University of Liege, Case 241/86, [1988] E.C.R 379. ProfessorJulian Lonbay provides a
useful commentary in Julian Lonbay, Education and Law: The Community Context, 14
EUR. L. REv. 363 (1989).
31. See Nicholas Christian, English Student in Legal Fight over Fees, SCOTLAND ON SUN-
DAY, Jan. 9, 2005, available at http://scodandonsunday.scotsman.com. The U.S. Su-
preme Court also permits states to charge out-of-state students higher tuition than state
residents. See Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (per curiam).
32. The current Treaty on European Union's Article 4 gives the European Council
a policy-making function, to "define the general political guidelines" of the European
Union. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 20, art. 4. In a major change, the Draft
Treaty's Article 1-25 enables the European Council to take legally binding decisions,
although Article 1-21 forbids it to "exercise legislative functions." Compare id. with Draft
Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 1-21 & 1-25.
33. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1-41(7), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 31.
34. See id. art. 1-41(2), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 30-31.
35. See id. art. 1-43(1), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 32.
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words, the relevant provision embodies a mutual inter-State de-
fense pact.
One of the many problems in assessing the effects of the
Draft Treaty lies in the difficulty of identifying how far, in prac-
tice, it adds to what is already in place - whether by virtue of the
earlier EC and EU Treaties (and, in particular, the Treaty of
Nice),36 or by virtue of other international instruments and/or
membership in other international organizations. Associated
with that problem is the fact that the Draft Treaty contains, like
the old ones, a mass of provisions which would normally be
found in ordinary (i.e., non-constitutional) legislation.
What is, and is not, included in the Draft Treaty appears to
have been determined by historical rather than rational consid-
erations. By way of example, take competition law - and in the
interest of simplicity I will leave aside the rules that govern the
grant by Member States of State aid.3" What are now Articles 81-
86 of the Treaty establishing the European Community" and
were Articles 85-90 of the original Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community 9 are reenacted in their entirety as
Articles 111-161 to 111-166 of the Draft Treaty.4 ° The Draft Treaty
does not include, however, the Council Regulation which ren-
dered control of mergers with an EC dimension part of EC com-
petition law,4 1 and which is of equal substantive importance to
the Treaty Articles that are concerned with anti-competitive
agreements and abuse by undertakings of a dominant position.4 2
Nor does the Draft Treaty contain even a hint that the so-called
36. The Treaty of Nice, signed on February 6, 2001, and effective February 1, 2003,
is published in OJ. C 80/1 (Mar. 10, 2001). The current text of the Consolidated
Treaty on European Union and the consolidated European Community Treaty include
the amendments made by the Treaty of Nice. For an appraisal of the principal institu-
tional modifications produced by the Treaty of Nice, see Goebel, European Union in
Transition, supra note 12.
37. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 111-167 to III-169, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 71-
73.
38. See EC Treaty, arts. 81-86, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), at 64-66.
39. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 2957,
U.N.T.S. 11, arts. 85-90, at 70-74 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
40. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 111-161 to 111-166, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 68-
71.
41. See Council Regulation No. 139/2004, O.J. L 24/1 (2004) [hereinafter EC
Merger Regulation], replacing Council Regulation 4064/1989, O.J. L 395/1 (1989).
42. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 111-161 to 111-166, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 68-
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"Modernization Regulation"4 3 radically altered the way in which
the original basic Treaty provisions are implemented - a
change so fundamental in certain respects that the German
Monopolkommission formally expressed the view that the
change violated the EC Treaty.4 4
I would suggest that any rationally drafted constitution
would identify the competence of the EU in the area covered by
what is generally called competition law. It would clearly indi-
cate the relationship between EU competition law and the na-
tional competition laws of the Member States. 45 If it is to be gen-
erally comprehensible, it would also relegate the EU's extant
competition law to a separate EU competition law statute along
with implementing regulations. The constitution itself would
then simply specify the procedure or procedures for amending
the extant legislation. There is no obvious reason why the proce-
dure should be different according to whether the substantive
provision was included in the original EEC Treaty and is there-
fore in the new Draft Treaty or whether, like the Merger Control
provisions, it has been subsequently introduced by regulation.
But if there were to be some constitutional reason for drawing a
distinction, the constitution should do so explicitly rather than,
as under the Draft Treaty, by default and as a matter of historical
accident.
This criticism is not just that of any elderly, tidy-minded En-
glish lawyer. It is precisely the inclusion of a substantial amount
of non-constitutional legislative material in the Draft Treaty that
contributes to its length and complexity.46 According to Sir
43. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1 (2002).
44. See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Reform of
Regulation 17: Summary of the Observations, at 6-7 (2000).
45. The implications of Article 1-13(1)(b) of the Draft Treaty, that "[t]he Union
shall have exclusive competence in ... the establishing of the competition rules neces-
sary for the functioning of the internal market," were not immediately apparent to me.
I now believe, however, that the provision may facilitate the introduction of a Union-
wide "leniency regime" and a common "privilege regime" which, to be effective, would
need to extend to national as well as EU competition law. On the other hand, Member
States will retain the right to have and to implement national competition laws to the
extent, and only to the extent, that doing so does not prejudice the functioning of the
internal market. This is rather different from the position as it has been understood
until now, namely that EU competition law takes precedence. See BELLAMY & CHILD,
EUROPEAN COMMUNIry LAw OF COMPETi ION 10-074 to 10-080 (2001); see also Draft
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1-13(1) (b), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 15.
46. The Commission's Communication, A Constitution for the Union, COM
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David Edward, however, it would be both dangerous and
counter-productive to relegate what have hitherto been treaty ar-
ticles to, in effect, a separate corpus of legislation.4 7 Sir David
has not persuaded me on this point, but his views always com-
mand respect.
In a particular respect the task of the European Constitu-
tional Convention was especially difficult. One of the reasons
given by the Lord Chancellor in his recent Atkin Lecture for not
enacting a written constitution for the United Kingdom was a
desire not to arrest adjustment to changing conditions.4 8 If that
is a problem even in the case of an historically long-established
and mature State such as the United Kingdom, then it is obvious
that it presents fairly intractable problems for an organism such
as the EU, the final structure and operation of which were in-
tended by the Convention to remain open. Insofar as the Draft
Treaty does not contain non-constitutional legislation, it is there-
fore often aspirational as much as it is constitutional.
Yet the aspirations often remain bitterly controversial.
Some political leaders wish to facilitate and to introduce legisla-
tive measures primarily because those measures will provide uni-
form rules in all Member States,49 almost irrespective of whether
the introduction of the rules will provide EU citizens with practi-
cal benefits; it is enough that the uniformity of the rules will pro-
mote the development of the EU into what would be generally
recognized as a single, albeit federal, State. For such leaders, the
political value of the introduction of a measure at the EU level is
not wholly, or perhaps even primarily, dependent on the direct
consequences of the introduction of the measure in terms of so-
(2003) 548 Final, commenting on the Convention's initial Draft Constitution, made a
similar point in observing that Part III's provisions on Community policies "form a
lengthy, uneven and complicated whole which is drafted in a variety of styles and ...
has been superseded by the reality of current policies." Id. at 12.
47. Sir David does acknowledge, however, that the Draft Treaty would have bene-
fited greatly from consultation with professional legal draftsmen. See Sir David Edward,
Minutes of Evidence taken before European Scrutiny Committee on EU Constitutional
Treaty (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk (last visited
Mar. 28, 2005). Sir David Edward served as judge at the ECJ from 1992 to 2003.
48. See Atkin lecture, supra note 15.
49. See, e.g., Robert Weilaard, EU Leaders Face a Hard Sell of Constitution in Parliament
and Streets of Europe, Assoc. PREss WORLDSTREAM, June 20, 2004 (noting French Presi-
dentJacques Chirac's remarks that he would have preferred to have "gone further...
down the road of harmonization in social and fiscal areas" but was forced to make
compromises).
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cial or economic welfare. That is because such politicians be-
lieve that the stability of Europe in the face of both internally
disruptive forces and externally threatening forces is dependent
upon increased European integration, which requires, as they
believe, greater uniformity of rules throughout the EU as a
whole.
By contrast, other political leaders believe that the introduc-
tion of measures at the level of the EU must be justified by refer-
ence to the directly beneficial consequences of the measures in
question, that uniformity has no independent value, and that
often absence of EU rules is itself the best solution because it
leaves the political elements within the EU at lower levels free to
decide whether they want a rule at all, and if so, the content of
that rule. That clash of ideologies existed before the signing of
the Draft Treaty, and the Draft Treaty does not resolve the differ-
ences; rather, it often seeks to square the circle and thus stores
up problems for the future.
Here again, however, it is important to recognize that the
Constitutional Convention faced an intractable problem. The
only constraint that has any chance of inducing politicians to try
to improve the lives of the people for whom they are responsi-
ble, rather than pursuing a more or less selfish agenda of their
own, is if they must deliver benefits in order to get re-elected and
not thrown out at regular intervals. The members of the College
of Commissioners are subject to no such constraint. Yet those
who excoriate the Commissioners as unelected bureaucrats also
most vociferously oppose the Commissioners being made di-
rectly electable, or even indirectly electable, through the Euro-
pean Parliament. Hence, a critically important democratic con-
straint is absent. But at the same time election of the College of
Commissioners would detract politically from the status of the
Council which has been entrenched by the Draft Treaty so as to
lead a number of Continental commentators to describe the
Treaty as a triumph for an anti-federalist United Kingdom.5"
In one important respect, my views about the Draft Treaty
have changed in the course of examining it. My initial impres-
50. The current version of Article 1-1(1) of the Draft Treaty, for example, man-
dates the EU to exercise its conferred competences "on a Community basis," as op-
posed to the previous version requiring it to do so "on a federal basis," suggesting the
prevalence of anti-federalist sentiments of many European leaders. See Draft Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 1-1(1), OJ. C 310/1 (2004), at 11.
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sion was that it did nothing to create and strengthen effective
controls that have as their purpose to ensure that EU institutions
operate efficiently, transparently, and honestly. Even the Euro-
pean Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, which are
the least open to criticism of all the institutions, operate inef-
ficiently because of the rule that all written pleadings that are
not filed in French must be translated into French.5" This re-
mains the policy even though the members of these Courts, al-
most without exception, deal with material filed in the English
language with at least equal facility as they deal with material
filed in the French language.
Having said that, I am now persuaded that the Draft Treaty
offers actual or potential constitutional improvements in several
important respects. First, Article 1-24(6) provides that the Coun-
cil of Ministers shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes
on draft legislative acts. To that end, each Council meeting shall
be divided into two parts dealing with deliberations on legislative
acts and non-legislative activities, respectively. By implication,
the part of the meeting dealing with deliberation on EU legisla-
tive acts, and not just the final casting of votes after the matter
has been effectively decided, will be in public.
If the media do their job properly, that constitutional
change should make a real contribution to remedying the demo-
cratic deficit of which we have for so long now complained. We
shall now know, for example, not only by whom the United King-
dom was represented at meetings of the Council of Ministers,
but also what, if anything he or she said; who, if anyone, sup-
ported the British position; by whom and on what grounds it was
opposed; and who voted and in what direction. This change
remedies a near-scandalous situation in which a supposedly dem-
ocratic legislature transacted its business behind closed doors.5 2
It also seems unlikely that, even if it wished to do so, the
Council of Ministers could restrictively interpret its obligation of
51. See David Edward, How the Court of Justice Works, 20 EUR. L. REv. 539, 546-47
(1995). Although written documents are available to members, legal secretaries, and
law clerks in the language of the case, and parties may argue in any one of the twenty
official languages of the EU, all internal documents are still circulated in French.
52. See Article 1-50 of the Draft Treaty, which sets out the basic principles for the
transparency of Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, emphasizing the state-
ment in Article 1-46 on the principle of representative democracy: "Decisions shall be
taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen." Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art.
1-50, 0J. C 310/1 (2004).
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openness under Article 1-24(6) of the Draft Treaty so as to take
its effective decisions with regard to legislative proposals behind
closed doors and let in the public only for the formal vote that
gives legal effect to the informal decision already taken. I say
that partly because the expression "draft European legislative
acts" is very widely defined by Article 2 of the First Protocol to
the new Treaty. 3 By providing for scrutiny by the national Par-
liaments of all EU legislative acts while they are still in draft
form, Articles 2 and 3 of the First Protocol offer the second ma-
jor constitutional improvement to be initiated by the Draft
Treaty. 4 They also enable each national Parliament to deliver a
reasoned opinion on whether the draft measure complies with
the principle of subsidiarity which, together with the principle of
proportionality, is the first of the fundamental principles that
the Draft Treaty declares govern the limits of EU competences.55
Since the principle of subsidiarity is much more readily applica-
ble as a political principle than it is protectable by Courts
through determination of a justiciable issue, this is a major ad-
vance in promoting the application of the principle.56 If the
British Parliament is serious about subsidiarity, it will adequately
resource the Parliamentary Committees entrusted with the scru-
tiny of draft EU legislation.
The third change to be effected by the Draft Treaty, albeit
only a potential one, is set forth in Article III-274(1). In order to
combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the EU, the
provision authorizes the Council to enact a European law - to
establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office ("EPPO"). The
Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the
53. See id., Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union,
art. 2, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 204 (defining "draft European legislative acts" to include
.proposals from the Commission, initiatives from a group of Member States, initiatives
from the European Parliament, requests from the Court of Justice, recommendations
from the European Central Bank and requests from the European Investment Bank for
the adoption of a European legislative act").
54. See id., Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union,
arts. 2-3, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 204-05.
55. See id., Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality, O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 207-09.
56. The ECJ has given great deference to the decisions of the Community legisla-
ture (the Parliament and the Council actingjointly through co-decision, or the Council
acting alone) in application of the principle of subsidiarity. See Germany v. Parliament
& Council, Case C-233/94, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2405 (upholding the Deposit Guarantee Di-
rective against Germany's claim of a violation of the principle of subsidiarity).
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European Parliament. If and when the EPPO is established, it
will be responsible for investigating and prosecuting, in the crim-
inal courts of Member States, offenses against the EU's financial
interests as determined by the European law. Its competence
may, if so agreed unanimously by the Council after obtaining the
consent of the European Parliament and consulting the Com-
mission, be extended to cover cross-border and multi-State seri-
ous crime. 7
Alarmists have suggested that, if the EPPO is established,
law-abiding British citizens will be at risk of a knock at the door
at 3 a.m. by an EU secret police wearing Stasi-type uniform and
uncontrolled by our honest British constabulary and judiciary.58
This scenario, however, is even less likely than such a knock on
the door being made by a secret state police of our own Home
Secretary. Far from opposing the establishment of an EPPO, we
should agitate in favor of its establishment. No doubt with nota-
ble exceptions, Member States are liable to view, with relative
equanimity, the dishonest diversion to their own citizens of EU
funds - even to be welcomed as a nice little earner - at the
expense only of the probably equally dishonest citizens of other
Member States.5 9 The EPPO could also be given power to deal
with the dishonest diversion of EU funds and the acceptance of
corrupt payments by members of the EU institutions. An EPPO
would provide us with improved protection in these areas. The
fact that the EPPO would be an appendage of Eurojust6 ° would
itself provide some safeguard against the EPPO becoming an in-
strument of oppression rather than, as intended, an instrument
of justice.
57. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. 111-274(4), O.J. C 310/1 (2004), at 121; see
also House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Twenty-third Report
(2004), 90-97.
58. See, e.g., House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Sixteenth Re-
port (2004), 61 (noting the controversy the proposal caused in the House of Lords as
well as concerns that the prosecutor's office "might not be accountable.., democrati-
cally").
59. See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Criminal Law
Protection of the Financial Interests of the Community and the Establishment of a Eu-
ropean Prosecutor, COM (2001) 715 Final, at 6-8 (detailing the prevalence of fraud in
EC institutions).
60. The European Judicial Cooperation Unit ("Eurojust") has been established to
facilitate cooperation among Member States' judicial authorities and coordinate prose-
cutions in the area of organized crime. See id. at 64-65 (detailing the EPPO's proposed
interaction with Eurojust).
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It would no doubt have been unrealistic to have expected
the Convention to have proposed for inclusion in the Draft
Treaty a further provision for ensuring financial probity and
transparency along the following lines: If in a third consecutive
year of a College of Commissioners, the Court of Auditors found
itself unable to audit the Commission's Accounts or felt it neces-
sary substantially to qualify the audit report, the Commissioners'
salaries would be reduced by 20 percent, in a fourth year by 40
percent, and in a fifth year by 60 percent. In conversation with
me, a senior Commission official readily accepted that such a
provision could be expected to work wonders by enabling the
presently toothless Court of Auditors to perform the duty im-
posed on it by Article 1-31 of the Draft Treaty "to ensure good
financial management." Instead, however unsuccessful a Com-
missioner may have been, he or she often returns to his or her
home country with a substantial Community pension, often paid
on top of a well-remunerated public sector post.61
My conclusion therefore is that the Draft Treaty is immedi-
ately flawed in that it does not comprise a concise statement of
constitutional principles but also includes a rag-bag of non-con-
stitutional legislation and a number of non-EU intergovernmen-
tal provisions which should have been stripped out of anything
that is to be marketed to electorates as a Constitution. In conse-
quence, the Treaty is not at all user-friendly and is liable to ag-
gravate the fears of ordinary citizens who no longer trust the po-
litical class to tell them honestly what they are letting themselves
in for if they vote to ratify the new Treaty.
On the other hand, the Draft Treaty has the merit of consol-
idating in a single text a number of earlier documents, reference
to which could be inconvenient. Secondly, the new Treaty en-
ables EU law to be modified and, within the limits of the EU's
competences, extended without the need for the making of fur-
ther treaties, though still in important cases only if the Member
States unanimously agree.62 Thirdly - and this is a respect in
which I have become better disposed towards the Draft Treaty -
61. See Vaughne Miller, Institutional Reform in the European Union, House of
Commons Library Research Paper 99/54, at 11-12 (1999) (detailing past problems with
"administrative and organizational transparency" with regard to commissioners' sala-
ries).
62. See Draft Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV-444 - IV-445, OJ. C 310/1, at 136-38 (es-
tablishing a framework in which certain Treaty amendments can be adopted by the EU
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it does contain significant improvements of a constitutional na-
ture compared with the pre-existing position. If the Draft Treaty
is ratified, whether with or without changes being agreed to it,
an acid test of its efficacy will be whether it prevents EU institu-
tions, and the EU itself, from becoming increasingly the subject
of opprobrium such as, in the end, destroyed the Weimar Re-
public.63
Despite the clear lessons of history, European politicians
seem to have lost sight of the fact that the EU, which is a recent
creation comprising a multitude of ethnic, linguistic, religious
and cultural groups, needs even more than a traditional nation
State to be valued by its citizens for the practical benefits that
they perceive it to confer on them. Increasingly, citizens of the
Member States have perceived the EU to be engaged in officious
and unnecessary intermeddling which has simply complicated
their lives and added to the costs which in one way or another
the citizen has to bear. The Draft Treaty may be capable of re-
versing that trend. Whether or not it does so, however, will de-
pend on how the EU institutions and the national Parliaments
implement the provisions of the Treaty.
Finally, what will happen if, as is likely, the British referen-
dum on the Draft Treaty produces a negative result?6 4 The posi-
tion will differ according to whether any other Member State or
Member States also vote No or whether the United Kingdom is
alone in so doing. Ironically, it is likely that the other State that
will vote "no" will be France, and that the French will do so on
the ground that the Draft Treaty is too "Anglo-Saxon" - which I
take, perhaps wrongly, to mean that it does not clear the way for
the imposition by Qualified Majority Voting ("QMV") of EU
without the adoption of formal treaties). In important cases, the modification can be
achieved only with the unanimous consent of Member States. See id.
63. See generally ERICH EYCK, A HISTORY OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC (1970). Exploit-
ing the insecurity arising from the economic crises of the decade following World War
I, Hider effectively destroyed the Weimar Republic in 1933 with the passing of the Ena-
bling Act, which allowed him to rule by decree. Having issued an emergency decree
suspending civil liberties, Hider effectively replaced the constitution and turned the
Weimar Republic into a Fascist dictatorship. See id.
64. Great Britain's previous European referendum in 1975 was in favor of contin-
ued membership in the European Community. On February 9, 2005, the ratification
bill for the Draft Treaty was approved in its second reading by the House of Commons,
though its eventual ratification is not expected to take place until 2006. See European
Commission, The Future of the European Union Debate, available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
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measures to promote social solidarity along the lines of the
Franco-German model. However, I shall assume here that only
the United Kingdom votes "no."6 5
I would like to think that the work-product of the Constitu-
tional Convention, which undoubtedly labored long and hard,
would, because of the defects and deficiencies in the new Treaty,
have cleared the minds of objective and, on the whole, friendly
observers such as myself and led to a recognition of the need to
go back to the drawing-board to produce a real constitution.
But I doubt that that will happen. It would involve too much loss
of face by too many people. Also, as I have said, I believe the
new Treaty, despite its faults, has important real and potential
merits.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that if there is a "no" vote in a
British referendum, the other Member States will tell the United
Kingdom simply that it must toe the line or get out. Even if by
then we were to have a Conservative government, I would expect
a classic fudge to emerge such as to enable the British govern-
ment to claim a great victory and win a "yes" vote the second
time around.
Of two things I am quite sure: If the United Kingdom were
to secede from the EU, it would not be allowed to do so on terms
that left it perceptibly better off since that would create a highly
dangerous precedent for the EU.6 6 Secondly, even if the United
Kingdom were to secede on terms that left it not directly worse
off, the secession would be a grave misfortune for Europe. I
hope that that does not sound ridiculously Anglopocentric, to
coin a word; but I do believe that the presence of the United
Kingdom within the EU is strongly in the European interest.
Though the British Isles are offshore islands, we are Europeans,
like it or not, and we share the European interest with our main-
land neighbors.
65. My assumption has since been falsified. See supra note 2. In consequence, the
whole future of the Draft Treaty is now in serious doubt.
66. Neither the current Treaty on European Union nor the European Community
Treaty contain any provision dealing with the issue of whether States that have joined
the EU may subsequently secede, and if so, under what legal process they may do so.
The Draft Treaty's Article 1-60 on the procedures for a State's voluntary withdrawal
from the European Union would not be applicable as such, but might provide some
inspiration for the procedure to be used in the event of a UK withdrawal.
1108
